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Implicit measures are often preferred to overt questioning in many areas of
psychology. Their covert nature allows them to circumvent conscious ex-
pectations and biases, theoretically providing more objective indicators of
people’s true attitudes and beliefs. However, we argue that implicit and ex-
plicit measures tap into different memory systems, so that the interpretation
of implicit measures is not as straightforward as the interpretation of ex-
plicit measures. We conducted an experiment investigating the relation
between implicit and explicit measures of person impressions. The results
demonstrate that a single stimulus can have opposite effects on implicit
and explicit measures, supporting the theory that the measures reflect the
contents of different memory systems. We suggest that implicit measures
reflect simple associations stored in a “slow–learning” memory system,
while explicit measures reflect a combination of these associations with
contextually dependent memories stored in a “fast–binding” memory
system.
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Whenever you ask someone a question, you can expect that the
motivations of your potential informant will have a strong influ-
ence on the answer that you get. People who want to please you
will change their answer to reflect what they think you want to
hear. People who want to impress you with their knowledge will
provide you with more information than you need to hear. People
who want to deceive you may actually do their best to lead you to
the wrong conclusion. While there is always the possibility that
the response will actually answer the question you asked, you
will typically have to take these and other potential biases into ac-
count when interpreting what people say. For this reason, many
researchers have come to prefer implicit measures of psychologi-
cal constructs, where participants’ mental states are inferred from
their performance on a task, to explicit measures, where partici-
pants are directly asked to report their own introspections. Im-
plicit measures are now commonly used in many areas of
psychology, including attitudes (Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, & Powell,
1986; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), self–esteem
(Koole, Dijksterhaus, & van Knippenberg, 2001), prejudice
(Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997), and
impression formation (Carlston & Skowronski, 1994; Winter &
Uleman, 1984).
Recently, however, there has been debate regarding the best way
to interpret the responses to implicit measures. Initially implicit
measures were developed to be relatively straightforward substi-
tutes for explicit questions whose validity could be compromised
by response biases (e.g., Dovidio & Fazio, 1992; Gaertner &
McLaughlin, 1983). However, studies indicated that the relations
between implicit and explicit measures were often very weak (e.g.,
Lowery, Hardin, & Sinclair, 2001; Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary,
2001; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 2001). Researchers first assumed
that this was because the explicit measures allowed for the possi-
bility of deception, but later investigators considered whether
these differences might be caused by something more fundamen-
tal. In a review of the use of implicit measures in social psychology,
Greenwald and Banaji (1995) suggested a firm distinction between
implicit and explicit cognition. They define implicit effects as those
that influence participants’ thoughts or behaviors in a way that is
not detectable by introspective or self–report measures. These ef-
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fects appear to operate automatically and outside of conscious
awareness. On the other hand, explicit processes require the appli-
cation of conscious thought, and so could potentially be described
by the person doing the processing. Wilson, Lindsey, and Schooler
(2000) proposed a “dual attitudes” model, claiming that people
have both automatic and conscious components to their attitudes.
When people make a deliberate decision as to what they should do,
the conscious component of their attitude (corresponding to what
is captured by explicit measures) will have a dominating impact on
their behaviors. When people act without much deliberation, the
automatic component of their attitude (corresponding to what is
captured by implicit measures) will have a dominating impact on
their behaviors.
It turns out that the field of attitudes is not the only one where
there seem to be separate conscious and automatic contributions
to behavior. Smith and DeCoster (2000) analyzed such dual–pro-
cess models across social and cognitive psychology and discov-
ered a large number of similarities across the models. They then
presented a general framework to explain how and when people
will use automatic and conscious processing. Smith and
DeCoster’s formulation is similar to the dual attitudes model in
that it proposes that people tend to rely on automatic processing
unless they have strong motivations and adequate capacity to
process consciously, in which case they will perform conscious
processing. However, they go one step further and claim that the
differences in the two processing modes arise from the fact that
they make use of different types of memories. Smith and
DeCoster claim that automatic processing is based purely on a
“slow–learning” memory system (believed to physically reside in
the neocortex—see McClelland, McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995)
whose job is to represent long–term, stable knowledge about the
environment. Information in this system is not represented by
discrete memories or exemplars. Instead, the authors propose
that this knowledge is stored as a set of associations among envi-
ronmental characteristics, similar to the way that a connectionist
memory can store information about a large number of stimuli in
a single set of weighted links (Smith & DeCoster, 1998).
Conscious processing is also assumed to make use of the
slow–learning memory system, but it also adds information from
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a separate “fast–binding” memory system (believed to physically
reside in the hippocampus—see McClelland, et al., 1995). This lat-
ter system is designed to capture the details of specific experi-
ences. Instead of representing information as a set of associations,
the fast–binding system is believed to store information about a
specific experience as a coherent whole. The representations in
this system will contain information about specific events, includ-
ing elements of the context. The fast–binding system can then use
these relations as part of its interpretation of the stimulus.
It is important to note Smith and DeCoster (2000) allow that
both the slow–learning and the fast–binding systems can be af-
fected by the exposure to a single stimulus. The difference in their
names reflects what the system as a whole is designed represent,
rather than the systems’ abilities to respond to new information.
The content of the slow–learning system is designed to represent
an amalgam of experiences over a long period of time, so the sys-
tem as a whole will change only slowly over time. The fast–bind-
ing system, on the other hand, is designed to store memories of
specific episodes, and so the system as a whole needs to be able to
change quickly to fully represent new episodes.
The presence of separate but interacting memory systems is
consistent with the results of several prior studies. Research by
Hastie and Park (1986) demonstrated that people’s memory for
the information that led to an evaluative judgment is dissociated
from their memory for the evaluation itself. This can be easily ex-
plained if the judgment is stored in the slow–learning memory
system as an association built up between the target and a posi-
tive or negative evaluation, while the data used to form the judg-
ment are kept as verbal statements in the fast–binding memory
system. Similarly, research by Martin, Seta, and Crelia (1990) has
demonstrated that while diverting conscious attention prevents
conscious processing and the formation of verbal memories
(those stored in the fast–binding system), it does not influence
people’s abilities to form simple associations (those stored in the
slow–learning system).
We wish to propose that implicit measures generally reflect the
results of automatic processing while explicit measures generally
reflect the results of conscious processing. Combined with Smith
and DeCoster’s (2000) discussion of the relations between pro-
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cessing modes and memory systems, this provides us with a basis
for understanding the differences in the information provided by
implicit and explicit measures. Specifically, we would claim that
implicit measures primarily reflect associations maintained in the
slow–learning memory system while explicit measures reflect a
combination of the slow–learning memory system with the
fast–binding memory system.
One important implication of having two independent memory
systems is that the contents of the two systems do not necessarily
need to be consistent with each other. Even though the content of
both memory systems is ultimately shaped by the same experi-
ences, differences in the way that the two systems process this in-
formation could potentially lead to different representations of
the same event. The fact that the two systems store their represen-
tations in different areas of the brain means that any inconsisten-
cies between them do not have to be resolved. We would next like
to present a demonstration that not only can the implicit and ex-
plicit measures of parallel constructs be distinct, but also that they
can actually contradict each other.
DESIGN AND HYPOTHESES
This study was intended to clarify the differences between how
information is represented in the slow–learning and fast–binding
memory systems, and in particular demonstrate that a single
stimulus event might lead to different (even opposite) representa-
tions in the two systems. In their own presentation of a dual–pro-
cess model, Strack and Deutsch (2004) specifically claim that
negations (statements that something is not true, such as “Sam is
not messy”) are processed differently by automatic and conscious
processing. They propose that in conscious processing, the word
“not” is used to modify the meaning of the word “messy,” while
in automatic processing, both “not” and “messy” are associated
with Sam individually. We therefore suspected that exposure to a
linguistic negation might create a dissociation between the con-
tents of the two memory systems. The fast–binding memory sys-
tem, reflecting the operation of linguistic and logically based
conscious processing, should be able to represent the meaning of
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the negation. Thus, a memory representation might be formed
that indicates Sam is not messy, or perhaps that Sam is neat. In
contrast, the slow–learning memory system deals not with lin-
guistic constructs or with logical operations such as negation, but
simply with associations. Encountering a statement that Sam is
not messy would lead to the joint activation of the concepts of
Sam and messy, creating an association between these two
concepts. We therefore suspect that exposure to a negation will
lead to the creation of contradictory associations in the two
memory systems.
We decided to conduct our investigation in the area of impres-
sion formation. Our basic method would be to provide partici-
pants with a photograph paired with trait information. This
information would state that the person either did or did not have
a given trait. We wanted to compare implicit and explicit mea-
sures of the association between the person and the stimulus trait,
specifically when participants are told that a particular individual
does not have a trait. We predict that when asked an explicit ques-
tion about their impression, participants will indeed report that
the target did not have the paired trait, since they will be able to
make use of a coherent impression of the target found in their
fast–binding system. However, we suspected that an implicit
measure would indicate an association between the target and the
trait since the slow–learning system would simply record that the
two stimuli had been paired together.
METHOD
RESEARCH PARTICIPANTS
Eighty–one participants from introductory psychology classes at
Purdue University completed the study in partial fulfillment of
course requirements.
PROCEDURE
Each participant was seated in an individual room in front of a
computer. They were told that they would be working either on
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the computer or in a booklet next to the computer, and that all in-
structions would appear on the computer screen.
Participants were first asked to examine a number of person de-
scriptions, each consisting of a photograph and a sentence indi-
cating that the individual either did or did not possess a particular
trait (e.g., Rolanda IS helpful; Sam is NOT neat). When each pairing
was presented, participants were instructed to copy down the
sentence from the screen into the provided booklet. On the next
line, they were asked to come up with their own example of a be-
havior that the pictured person might perform. Participants com-
pleted a total of 16 behavior–writing trials, each including either a
positive or negative trait, preceded or not preceded by the word
“not.” Participants never saw both traits of a diametrically op-
posed pair (such as “neat” and “messy”). Participants next per-
formed a distractor task for approximately five minutes (naming
countries beginning with each letter of the alphabet), supposedly
as a measure of long–term memory. Participants then completed
either an implicit or explicit measure testing the associations
created in the initial exposure task between the traits and
photographs.
The procedure for the remainder of the study varied depending
on whether the participant was in the explicit measure condition
or the implicit measure condition. For the explicit measure, par-
ticipants were directly told that we wanted to collect their impres-
sions of the individuals they saw in the exposure task. In each of
16 trials, participants viewed a photograph that they had seen in
the exposure task along with a set of three traits. They were asked
to rate the extent to which they felt the person in the photo pos-
sessed each of the traits on a scale of one to seven, where higher
numbers indicated that the trait was more applicable. Two of the
traits in each trial were unrelated to those presented in the person
descriptions. Half of the time the remaining trait was the one orig-
inally paired with the photo in the person descriptions (but with-
out the word “not” in all cases), while in the other half the trait
was the bipolar opposite of the original trait. Whether the critical
trait was rated first, second, or third was randomly determined
on each trial.
An illustration of how the explicit measure was implemented is
provided in Figure 1.
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Each participant performing the explicit rating task had (A)
four trials where they wrote sentences saying that a person had
trait X in the exposure task and then evaluated the person on trait
X in the rating task, (B) four trials where they wrote sentences say-
ing that a person had trait X in the exposure task and then evalu-
ated the person on the bipolar opposite of trait X in the rating task,
(C) four trials where they wrote sentences saying that a person
did NOT have trait X in the exposure task and then evaluated the
person on trait X in the rating task, and (D) four trials where they
wrote sentences saying that a person did NOT have trait X in the
exposure task and then evaluated the person on the bipolar oppo-
site of trait X in the rating task. In this task, higher ratings indicate
a stronger explicit association. We therefore expect the ratings
provided in conditions A and D (where the trait being rated is log-
ically consistent with the information provided in the initial
exposure) to be higher than the ratings provided in conditions B
and C.
FIGURE 1.  Conditions in the explicit ratings measure.
We used Carlston and Skowronski’s (1994) “savings in relearn-
ing” procedure as our implicit measure. This method is based on
the work of Ebbinghaus (1885/1964), who demonstrated that it
was easier to relearn a pairing between two objects when the two
objects and been paired together previously. Recall that in the ex-
posure task, participants were asked to write a total of 16 sen-
tences, 8 pairing photos with statements that the pictured
individual possessed a trait, and 8 pairing photos with statements
that the pictured individual did not possess a trait. Participants
completing the implicit measure were then asked to memorize 30
photo–trait pairs. The instructions indicated that some of the pho-
tographs might have been viewed earlier in the study. Eight
paired a photo and trait that were originally presented together in
the person descriptions (but without the word “NOT” in all
cases). Eight paired a photo presented in the person descriptions
with the bipolar opposite of the trait presented with that photo. In
each condition, half of the traits were evaluatively positive and
half were evaluatively negative. The remaining 14 pairs included
novel photographs and traits. Participants then completed a sec-
ond distractor task where they were asked to perform complex
mental arithmetic problems for approximately five minutes. Fi-
nally, they performed a cued–recall task where a photo was dis-
played on the screen for eight seconds and participants were
asked to write down the trait that had been paired with the photo
in the memorization task. Each photo only appeared once in the
memory task, and only one member of each bipolar trait pair
appeared in the memory task.
An illustration of how the implicit measure was implemented is
provided in Figure 2. Each participant performing the implicit
savings in relearning task had (A) four trials where they wrote
sentences saying that a person had trait X in the exposure task and
were then asked to memorize a pairing of that person with trait X
in the memory task, (B) four trials where they wrote sentences
saying that a person had trait X in the exposure task and were
then asked to memorize a pairing of that person with the bipolar
opposite of trait X in the memory task, (C) four trials where they
wrote sentences saying that a person did NOT have trait X in the
exposure task and were then asked to memorize a pairing of that
person with trait X in the memory task, and (D) four trials where
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they wrote sentences saying that a person did NOT have trait X in
the exposure task and were then asked to memorize a pairing of
that person with the bipolar opposite of that trait in the memory
task. The memory task also included 14 additional pairings of
novel photos with traits unrelated to those seen in the exposure
task. In this task, better memory indicates a stronger implicit asso-
ciation. We therefore expect the proportion of photo–trait pairs
correctly recalled in conditions A and B (where same trait is used
in both the exposure task and the memory task) to be higher than
the ratings provided in conditions C and D.
We have several reasons to believe that the savings in relearn-
ing method provides an implicit measure of the association be-
tween two objects. Evidence for this is provided by the fact that
the savings effect is present long after explicit memory for the
original pairing is long forgotten (Ebbinghaus, 1885/1964).
Carlston and Skowronski (1994) have also demonstrated that this
measure could be used to detect trait inferences automatically
and unintentionally formed when reading behavioral statements.
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FIGURE 2.  Conditions in the implicit savings in relearning measure.
Although our procedure differs, the rationale for our predictions
is identical.
RESULTS
There were no main effects or interactions with trait valence on ei-
ther of the two tasks, so all of the results reported below average
over both positive and negative traits.
EXPLICIT RATING TASK
The explicit ratings were submitted to a within–subjects ANOVA
including exposure condition (whether the target was said to pos-
sess the trait or not at exposure) and trait match (whether the rat-
ings were made of the same trait used at exposure or its bipolar
opposite) as factors. Table 1 presents the explicit ratings for each
cell in the design. There were no main effects of exposure condi-
tion F(1, 39) = 0.01, p > .9, or trait match F(1, 39) = 0.16, p > .6, on the
rating. However, we did observe a significant interaction be-
tween exposure condition and trait match F(1, 39) = 20.53, p <
.0001). As predicted, the ratings found in cells A and D of Table 1
are significantly higher than those in cells B and C, t(39) = 3.84, p <
.0005). When told that a target possessed a trait, explicit ratings
were higher for that trait than its bipolar opposite. When told that
a target did not possess a trait, the explicit rating of the bipolar op-
posite was stronger. This indicates that participants accurately
used the “not” prefix when forming their explicit judgments of
the targets.
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TABLE 1. Explicit Trait Ratings by Exposure Condition and Response Match
Exposure
“IS trait”
Exposure
“Is NOT trait”
Rating trait same as exposure trait A = 4.46 (1.22) B = 3.67 (1.06)
Rating trait opposite of exposure trait C = 3.61 (0.85) D = 4.51 (0.89)
Note. The letters A through D correspond to the conditions as presented in Figure 1. The number fol-
lowing the equal sign is the mean rating for the condition, while the number in parentheses is the stan-
dard deviation.
IMPLICIT SAVINGS IN RELEARNING TASK
We then submitted the recall accuracies of the implicit task to this
same analysis. Table 2 presents the recall accuracies for each cell
in the design. We observed a significant main effect of trait match
F(1, 40) = 9.82, p < .004, but no influence of the exposure condition
F(1, 40) = 0.21, p > .6. The interaction of trait match and exposure
condition was also non–significant F(1, 40) = 0.40, p > .5. As pre-
dicted, the proportion correct in cells A and B of Table 2 is signifi-
cantly higher than the proportion correct in cells C and D t(40) =
3.134, p < .004. Implicit associations were strongest between the
target and the exact trait presented at exposure, regardless of
whether the target was said to possess the trait or not. This indi-
cates that the “not” prefix did not have a significant influence on
the associations detected by the implicit measure.
While it is possible that savings could result from the use of
some explicit strategy, we do not believe that that is the case in
this study. First, participants did not expect that their impressions
of the individuals in the first part of the study would be examined
later on, and we included a difficult distractor task between the
exposure and test phases to make using such strategies more dif-
ficult. Second, participants might have recalled inconsistent
photo–trait pairings because this information is sometimes
well–remembered. But in that case, traits in condition D should
have been recalled as well as traits in condition B. Finally, even if
some participants did use an explicit strategy to assist their mem-
ory, it would simply make it more difficult for us to detect differ-
ences in the impressions tapped by implicit and explicit
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TABLE 2. Proportion Correct by Exposure Condition and Response Match
Exposur
“IS trait”
Exposure
“Is NOT trait”
Recall trait same as exposure trait A = .470 (.336) B = .427 (.302)
Recall trait opposite of exposure trait C = .323 (.264) D = .329 (.308)
Note. The letters A through D correspond to the conditions as presented in Figure 2. The number fol-
lowing the equal sign is the mean proportion correct for the condition, while the number in parenthe-
ses is the standard deviation.
measures, so this cannot act as an alternative explanation for any
differences we do observe.
DISCUSSION
The results from both the explicit and implicit measures support
our predictions, and are consistent with the interpretation that
they reflect the contents of different memory systems. Our study
examined how providing people with information that a target
individual did not possess a trait would affect their impressions
reported by implicit and explicit measures. We found that peo-
ple asked to explicitly report their impression stated that the tar-
get lacked the trait. However, people whose impressions were
measured implicitly showed an association between the target
and the denied trait. This illustrates that not only can there be
differences between the results of implicit and explicit measures
of person impressions, but that they can actually contradict each
other.
Although differences between implicit and explicit measures
have commonly been ascribed to intentional correction effects
(Dovidio & Fazio, 1992), we do not believe that this is the case
with our study. This effect was found across a collection of 16 dif-
ferent traits covering a broad set of characteristics, so it is unlikely
to be caused by attempts to correct for stereotyping. Additionally,
the same effect was found for positive and negative traits, so it is
unlikely that our results are a result of people trying to present
more positive or more negative impressions. Since there appears
to be no reason to believe that our results are due to a correction
effect, we believe that they indicate that people have formed two
separate impressions of the target person, and that they coexist in
memory even though they contradict each other. A parsimonious
explanation for this is provided by the dual–memory system dis-
cussed above. It would claim that the explicit measure reflects a
representation in the fast–binding system while the implicit mea-
sure reflects a representation in the slow–learning memory sys-
tem. The fact that the representations for these systems are stored
in different areas of the brain allows them to independently coex-
ist. While it is certainly possible for implicit and explicit measures
to provide similar results, they can differ significantly if the ex-
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plicit measure makes strong use of information contained in the
fast–binding memory system and this information differs from
that contained in the slow–learning memory system.
IMPLICATIONS OF A DUAL–MEMORY SYSTEM
INTERPRETATION
From a dual–memory system perspective, we would expect that
measures that are processed automatically solely reflect the con-
tents of the slow–learning system, while measures that are pro-
cessed consciously can reflect either the contents of the
slow–learning or the fast–binding system. Our results that the
memories tapped by implicit and explicit measures of person im-
pressions appear to reflect distinct mental representations pro-
vides evidence that distinct memory systems are implicated in
the processing of these two measures. We would also like to sug-
gest that the dual–memory system interpretation also applies to
implicit and explicit measures of other phenomena, assuming
that the implicit measure represents automatic processing while
the explicit measure represents conscious processing.
So what does this perspective have to say about associations de-
tected using implicit measures? Does it mean that a person who
demonstrates an association between two objects on an implicit
measure consciously believes that the two objects are related?
Clearly not, since implicit measures often have only a small rela-
tion to their explicit counterparts (Dovidio, Kawakami, &
Gaertner, 2002). Does it mean that the person has some “gut feel-
ing” that the two objects are related that can’t easily be put into
words? Not necessarily. In our study, the explicit measure of the
impression simply asks participants to rate the extent to which
they thought that a target person had particular traits, without
asking them for any explanation or justification for their rating.
We would therefore expect that our explicit ratings would also
have reflected any vague feelings that the target person and trait
were related, even if they could not be verbalized. Given that we
found divergent effects on our implicit and explicit measures, im-
plicit measures must at least in part reflect aspects of memory that
have no direct influence on explicit ratings.
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The dual–memory system account for implicit measures is
more complicated than either of these interpretations. It would
claim that implicit measures reflect associations within the
slow–learning memory system. Observing an association be-
tween two things on an implicit measure would therefore indi-
cate that those two things had been paired together in the
person’s past experience. This could represent either a recent
pairing (as in our study) or a pairing that had been consistently
observed over time. It would not necessarily reflect any beliefs,
conscious or unconscious, held by the person in which the
association is measured.
We must acknowledge two important limitations of our study.
First, the implicit and explicit measures that we used did differ
substantially. We cannot make any claims regarding the relative
strength of the implicit and explicit associations formed in our
study since our measures are clearly not equally sensitive. It could
be useful to replicate this study using implicit and explicit mea-
sures that parallel each other more closely. In addition, we exam-
ined different participants in the implicit and explicit conditions.
Our claims that implicit and explicit measures tap different mem-
ory systems would be even more compelling if we could demon-
strate dissociations between the two types of measures on the
same participants.
Our research supports the idea that implicit measures tap into
the simple associations stored in the slow–learning memory sys-
tem, so increasing our understanding of these associations will
better enable us to interpret these measures. We demonstrate two
important properties of this associative system. First, the contents
of this system simply represent what elements have been paired
together in the environment and may therefore fail to capture in-
ferences and conclusions deriving from conscious processing of
the events. Second, information in the slow–learning memory
system appears to be stored separately from information in the
fast–binding memory system, so we should expect that the two
might be inconsistent. Our success in explaining the results in this
study using a dual–memory systems model suggests that further
research on this model will help us understand how the
characteristics of our measures affect the results they provide.
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